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derson, 197 Ill. 549; Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 392; Getting v. Getting,
197 Mich. 446).
The modification may be justified for various changed conditions such
as the father's financial condition, inadequacy of the provision in the orig-
inal decree, etc.
But payments exacted by the original divorce decree become vested as
they accrue, and decrees which subsequently change the allowance cannot
have a retroactive effect. Such a decree relates only to the future. Kell
v. Kell, 179 Iowa 147; Evans v. Evans, 154 Cal. 644; Dilbridge v. Seares,
179 Iowa 526.
Thus it would seem that the court in the principal case has reached a
logical result and one that is in accord with established doctrines in this
field of the law. B. E. M.
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-PROMISSORY EsTOPPFr-Appellant owned
and operated a city water system. Appellee had been a customer of said
company for a long time prior to Feb. 11, 1929. On this date the appellee
requested appellant to shut off the flow of water by turning the shut-off valve
at the appellee's property line, as the house was to be vacated. Appellant
then and there agreed to do as requested. Appellee vacated the house, appel-
lant attempted to turn off the water at the property line, but failed to do
so because of the frozen condition of the ground. Pipes in the house bursted,
and considerable damage resulted. Appellee's complaint was drawn upon
the theory that on Feb. 11, 1929, a binding contract was entered into, and
that appellant failed to perform its obligation to appellee's damage. Com-
plainant received $275.00 judgment in the lower court. Held, judgment
reversed. Frankfort Waterworks Co. v. McBride, Appellate Court of In-
diana, March 4, 1931, 175 N. E. 140.
The reversal was based solely upon the proposition that there was no
consideration for the appellant's promise, that no mutuality existed, and
that such promise was thus merely a gratuitous and unenforceable one.
Now it is quite evident that as a result of the reliance upon this promise,
the appellee suffered considerable damage. A moral duty on the promisor is
present, but of course a moral breach is often not a legal one. For more
than a century learned jurists interested in the problem of developing legal
duties to coordinate moral obligations, have puzzled themselves over the
desirability of giving a remedy to one who has incurred expense or disap-
pointment through thinking that the other party was bound by his promise.
63 American Law Review, 33; Munroe Smith, A General View of European
Legal History, 195.
Those who have considered an extension in this direction have been con-
fronted by the fact that the law of contracts is conceded to be a branch of
the law wherein a high degree of certainty is desirable. Any development
made should be one of fairly uniform and universal application. The doc-
trine offered as a solution to this present problem is that of "promissory
estoppel."
Williston discusses the subject under the heading of "Estoppel as a Sub-
stitute for Consideration," and cites several cases in which the principle
has been applied to the formation of contracts, where, relying on a gratui-
tous promise, the promisee has suffered detriment. Williston, Contracts,
RECENT CASE NOTES
Sec. 139. There are now several well established situations in which reli-
ance on a promise renders the promissor liable, although there has been no
price or consideration paid for the promise.
Specific performance will lie on a gratuitous promise to convey land if
the promisee has been given possession or has both been given possession
and has made improvements. (See Restatement, Contracts, No. 4, Sec. 194.)
Likewise a promise not to enforce or foreclose a mortgage in reliance
upon which the promisee has made improvements is binding. Williston,
Contracts, p. 312, note 39.
Charitable subscriptions are generally enforced in the United Statei
after action in reliance upon them has been taken. Williston, Contracts,
Sec. 116; Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Bank, 246 N. Y. 369,
159 N. E. 173.
Gratuitous undertakings of bailees have been enforced when relied upon.
Williston, Contracts, Sec. 138. In Siegel v. Spear, 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N.
E. 414, a gratuitous bailee promised to obtain insurance on bailed property
but failed to do so, and was held liable on the basis of his promise.
Gratuitous promises made in expectation of marriage and justifiably
relied upon by the promisee have been universally enforced both in the
United States and England. Williston, Contracts, p. 312, note 41.
Gratuitous promises of a licensor acted upon to an extent that the
licensee has seriously changed his position are enforceable on the doctrine
of promissory estoppel, although the cases on this question are not uniform,
the probable weight of authority being opposite to the doctrine. Williston,
Contracts, p. 311. It is difficult to see, however, any rational distinction
between a promise to convey the land itself and a promise to allow a license
or an easement over it. A few states have definitely enforced the promise
of the licensor when injuriously relied upon. Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267,
16 Am. Dec. 497; Willis v. Erie City Passenger Railway Co., 188 Pa. 56,
66, 41 Atl. 307. The following Indiana cases have held a parol license irre-
vocable after considerable expenditure in reliance upon its being perpetual.
Messick v. Midland Ry. Co., 128 Ind. 81, 27 N. E. 419; Chamberlin v.
Myers, 68 Ind. App. 342, 120 N. E. 600.
Promises of waiver justifiably relied upon have been enforced, as where
a purchaser at judicial sale promises not to set up the statutory period for
the redemption of such property sold, but insists upon it after those wish-
ing to redeem have permitted the statutory period to pass. Williston,
Contracts, Sec. 139.
Thus there are several situations in which the historic theory of injur-
ious reliance has not been supplanted by the so-called Bargain Theory. The
American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec.
90, states the following: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise."
Applying this statement to the principal case, it is evident that the
Waterworks Co. should reasonably expect its promise to induce its customer
to forbear from turning off the water, and to leave the situation in the
hands of the promisor. Such entrusting of a duty on the execution of which
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depended the preservation of real estate is action of a definite and substan-
tial character. The promise actually did induce this identical action or
forbearance.
The final proviso is contained in the statement "if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise." The appellant company is
engaged in a public calling, upon which the appellee relied to fulfill its
promise to care for the property of the promisee by turning off the water.
It might even well be argued that under its duty to furnish adequate facili-
ties, the company was bound to shut off the water when a customer desired
to terminate the relationship. As a result of such reliance, the promisee,
thus entrusting its property, suffered considerable injury thereto, which
can be remedied only by compensation in the form of damages. Injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Probably one of the most glaring examples of injustice resulting from
reliance on the gratuitous promise is the case of Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala.
131. There a brother-in-law advised the widow of her brother to sell her
lands and come to him, promising that he would give her a place in which
to raise her family. The widow gave up her lands, went to the promisor,
and was provided for during a short time, but was then requested to get
out. Relief was denied on the ground that such a mere gratuitous promise
would not be enforced. That case was probably correctly decided in 1845,
but as exemplified by the Restatement cited above, there has been consider-
able development in formulating a workable doctrine of promissory estoppel
since that date. Despite this fact, the principal case has been added to the
category of Kirksey v. Kirksey, supra, supporting an archaic view that is
inherently unjust. P. J. D.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER-PROHIBITION OF MANUFACTURE
OF MATTRESSES OF SHODDY-Defendant was indicted, charged and convicted
for unlawfully manufacturing mattresses from material made of shoddy
under Statute, Sec. 8250, Burns' Ann. St. 1926. The assignment of errors
was the overruling of motion to quash indictment and motion for new trial.
The defendant complained the statute was unconstitutional as beyond the
limit of the police power. Held, The statute is constitutional but the case
must be reversed, because indictment failed to set out facts charging a
public offense. Weisenberger v. State, Sup. Ct. of Ind., March 4, 1931,
175 N. E. 238.
An inconsistency seemingly exists between the interpretation of the stat-
ute and the indictment. The former was construed liberally and upheld
whereas the latter was construed strictly and held faulty. The statute was
construed to mean that any manufacture or sale of mattresses made from
unsanitary or contaminated shoddy should be a penal offense. The indict-
ment, following the language of the statute made no reference to unsanitary
shoddy but charged in general terms. The rules of construction applicable
to the two are quite different so that the decisions might be reconciled.
Courts will make presumptions in favor of the constitutionality of a stat-
ute until the contrary clearly appears. Hays v. Tippy, 91 Ind. 102; State
ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382. The rule of construction of indict-
ments has always been very strict because of public policy in favor of
having an accused person apprised of his offense in clear and concise terms.
Bates v. State, 31 Ind. 72; Schmidt v. State, 78 Ind. 41.
